STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

OAKLAND CARES COALITION,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-195672-AW

LOREE ZELENOCK as Village Clerk of The Village of Leonard, in her official capacity, VILLAGE COUNCIL OF LEONARD, and LISA BROWN, in her official capacity as Oakland County Clerk,

Defendants./

MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE YASMINE I. POLES, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Pontiac, Michigan - Wednesday, August 24, 2022

APPEARANCES:

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	TABLE OF CON	ITENTS	
			PAGE
MITTING			
WITNESSES			
None			
EXHIBITS			RECEIVED
None offered.			

1	Pontiac, Michigan
2	Wednesday, August 24, 2022 - 10:14 a.m.
3	* * * * *
4	(Proceeding conducted via Zoom videoconference.)
5	THE CLERK: Your Honor, now calling number 29 on
6	the docket, Oakland Cares Coalition versus Zelenock, case
7	number 2022-195672-AW.
8	MR. KUMMER: Good morning, Your Honor. John
9	Kummer appearing on behalf of the defendants Loree
10	Zelenock and Village Council of Leonard.
11	MR. GRANDSTAFF: Good morning, Your Honor.
12	Anderson Grandstaff appearing on behalf of the plaintiff -
13	- of the plaintiff in this case, Oakland Cares Coalition.
14	MR. BUCK: Good morning, Your Honor. Brandon
15	Buck appearing on behalf of Oakland County Clerk, Lisa
16	Brown.
17	THE COURT: All right. Good morning, to all of
18	you.
19	Mr. Kummer, your motion. Go ahead.
20	MR. KUMMER: I apologize. I did place my
21	appearance first. It is Mr. Grandstaff's motion.
22	THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. Go ahead
23	please.
24	MR. GRANDSTAFF: Good morning, Your Honor. This
25	is a motion filed by plaintiff in regards to a ballot

initiative that was submitted last month. This ballot initiative was submitted to the Village of -- of Leonard in order to open one specific marijuana establishment, namely a marijuana retailer. After gathering the requisite number of signatures to this petition, the petition was submitted to the County on July 7th and the County then certified -- then drafted ballot language on July 25th.

The ballot language drafted by the County was prejudicial in several respects that are spelled out in our brief. But, put briefly they use misleading language the suggests that multiple marijuana establishments of varying types would be implemented throughout the Village and they also falsely imply that this ordinance would somehow impact the zoning powers afforded to the Village under Michigan law.

Now, I can tell from the responses that have been submitted there's some confusion as to what happened next and I address these arguments in our reply brief.

But, what essentially happened is that despite repeated efforts by the plaintiff to follow up with the County, the plaintiff was never apprised of the ballot language that was submitted to the Oakland County Clerk until August 15th of 2022 after business hours.

Now, as soon as they found out about this

prejudicial and misleading language counsel for plaintiff, my predecessor, sent an email trying to stop the certification and laying out the reasons for doing so.

Now, after that we engaged in negotiations to try to find a -- a middle road in terms of the language but these negotiations where ultimately unsuccessful and the core issues remain as to those two points; the multiple marijuana establishments and the zoning references.

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Now, we're requesting a writ of mandamus in this case because we have no effective other recourse. The election is coming up very soon, the ballots will very soon be printed, and we believe that all the elements for writ of mandamus have been completed here. There's a clear right that we have to the performance of a legal duty. There's a clear right for the defendant to perform that duty. They must submit non-prejudicial -- submit and certify non-prejudicial ballot language and they have not done so in this case. This act is ministerial because there's no discretion allowed. The language used is shall, they shall submit non-prejudicial language. And, finally we have no other adequate recourse as explained before.

Now, having -- having read over the arguments presented by the defendants in this case, I believe a core misunderstanding is that defendants appear to believe that

we were aware of the certification immediately after the meeting on July 25th of 2022. That is not the case. We certainly didn't rest on our laurels and wait for -- until we had no other option. So, the -- any appeal to the doctrine of laches is inapplicable in this case.

As to the rest of it, Your Honor, I -- we will rest on the arguments presented in our brief but we do believe that this language is -- is prejudicial and does not reflect the intent of Michigan voters and would severely prejudice the outcome of this ballot initiative so we would request a writ of mandamus be issued to correct this language.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Response?

MR. KUMMER: Thank you, Your Honor. If defendant Zelenock and Village Council may go first.

I'm happy to address the merits of plaintiff's argument with respect to the alleged prejudicial language. It's plaintiff's -- or defendants' contention it's not prejudicial. It's objectively factual with respect to MRTMA as applied to Leonard as well as the operation of Michigan law.

But, first I'd really like to just focus on the primary point which is a writ of mandamus is improper in this case. The statutory authority, the case law cited by

plaintiff is all of that case law which is requesting that any ballot question be certified to the County.

In those cases, like <u>Turner</u> versus <u>Royal Oak</u>

<u>Township</u>, rather <u>Oakland Cares Coalition</u> versus <u>Gwendolyn</u>

<u>Turner</u>, there wasn't language that was certified. The ministerial act was the certification of the language. In this case there was language that was certified. That ministerial act has occurred, MRTMA has been satisfied. The clear legal duty that plaintiff is entitled as been satisfied and he's not entitled to any current new legal duty for new language to be drafted for language to be decertified and recertified.

This entire case, this -- plaintiff's entire argument is premised upon the -- the claim that the language is allegedly prejudicial. If the Court is to accept this preposition then that's, you know, an admission by plaintiff that the writ of mandamus is seeking a act of discretion and judgment. It requires discretion and judgment to decide of language is prejudicial or not. It decides -- it requires discretion and judgment to draft specific language. And, the relief that's being requested and sought by plaintiff is that new language be drafted by defendant Zelenock and the Village Council, defendant Village Council. And, it's an improper function of a writ of mandamus to order such.

I'll -- I'll leave the statutory deadline argument to counsel for Lisa Brown as I believe it's more aptly briefed within their pleadings, but as far as the idea that there's some legal duty that still exists that plaintiff is owed or some legal duty that's still to be performed, those elements fail as most significantly the third which is that this is a ministerial act, it's simply not a ministerial act.

For those reasons it should be -- the motion and claims should be dismissed and denied.

As far as the arguments -- well actually I will add in reviewing the reply brief, I don't know if the Court accepted it for purposes of its, you know, review, but this is not contested. Plaintiff does not address these arguments that are made by defendants. There's no reply to those arguments which in my opinion is an admission by plaintiff that a mandamus is improper here. He can, you know, respond to that but there doesn't seem to be any new authority cited based on the absence of such being highlighted by defendants.

As far as the prejudicial allegations, this language that was used as certified accurately states Michigan law. And, that is also -- seems to be acknowledged by plaintiff in the reply brief. Reading from plaintiff's brief reply, they could have used

language that more clearly indicated that multiple marijuana establishment could only operate if they were based in the same physical location.

He's not saying that the reference that Michigan law, as applied to the Village, would allow for multiple establishments. He's not saying that's false. He's requesting further context to have been provided. If you look at MCL 168, section 485, it reads,

"The question shall be worded so as to apprise the voters of the subject matter of the proposal or issue but need not be legally precise."

Defendants have certified language that summarizes MRTMA as it operates, as it would be applied were this proposal to pass. It does so without specifically performing any legal analysis of the proposal which would be argued by plaintiff in an alternative pleading as, you know, a pre-election judicial determination which is not what's occurring here. So, they're -- they're under no obligation to cite the entire statutory provisions with respect to co-location, but plaintiff seems to acknowledge in his reply brief that multiple establishments would exist.

With respect to the reference or rather plaintiff's claim that we're suggesting -- defendants' are suggesting that there's some zoning function that's

occurring through the passage of this proposal, that's not the case. It's simply acknowledging what affect any ordinance that's passed authorizing any number of marijuana establishments could be located.

Plaintiff doesn't deny that they could be located in any area within Leonard, only that he believes, once again, additional language should have been added to be more legally precise. It appears that on both of these issues plaintiff concedes that the language isn't inherently wrong it's just not detailed enough. The Clerk, Zelenock, certified the entire ballot proposal along with the language that's been provided and cited in our brief to be able to provide any answer for any voter with any question specific to the ballot proposal.

So, you know, with that, I'll be happy to answer any questions that the Court has with respect to any arguments but I'd rely for the other argues as stated in our brief.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Buck?

MR. BUCK: Just to reiterate on what Mr. Kummer said, you know the elephant in the room is whether the relief being sought is discretionary. And, you know, if you just read the plaintiff's reply brief throughout they

recite pages and pages of facts relating to negotiations between Zelenock and themselves and discussions and what language would be good enough and what language isn't good enough and what's accurate enough and what isn't accurate enough. All that signals that it's the death now of mandamus. We all know that the case law is absolutely clear that you cannot get mandamus on a discretionary function.

Now, what the plaintiff's trying to twist this into is saying well the act of certification in and of itself is ministerial, but they're overlooking the fact that what they want -- what they're really asking for, what they asked for in the complaint is sort of a decertification of the language that we already have, redrafting of language that they believe would be appropriate and/or to comply with the statute or/and to be non-prejudicial. There's a lot of judgment -- exercise of judgment that would need to occur. Someone has to be the arbitor of the language whether it's sufficient, so on and so forth.

Now the County's sort of caught in the middle of this. The County's only role in this is to accept timely certification under the statute. There's been various references about the County drafting language. The County does not draft language. They have no function in that.

The Clerk doesn't have any role in that.

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As to the statutory deadline set forth in 646a, we've set forth that argument in the briefing. The County does not engage in any substantive review of language that's submitted to it. The 646a deadline is subject to strict compliance under Supreme Court precedent, Stand Up for Democracy, and, therefore, regardless of what's certified to the County Clerk there's no substantive review at our level. We just need to insure compliance that it's done timely. We don't have any ability to waive a deadline and the deadline is passed.

And, the last point I'll make is there are other remedies available to this plaintiff. They can put this language on a subsequent election at a later date. could have drafted their own language up front and avoided this all together. But, in any event, we don't believe that the Court can lawfully order the County Clerk to accept a late, "late" certification after expiration of a mandatory statutory deadline.

So, for all those reasons we ask that the Court deny the relief sought by plaintiffs and dismiss their complaint.

MR. GRANDSTAFF: Your Honor, may I please address some of the arguments were raised?

THE COURT: Briefly.

MS. GRANDSTAFF: Yes, Your Honor.

One of the points I would raise here is that pursuant to MCL 168.485, ballot language submitted shall not be pre -- prejudicial. There is no discretion there. This is not an act of discretion. They have violated a duty by certifying ballot language that is prejudicial.

Now, the reason that many of these arguments were not addressed in more detail in our reply brief is because we only have five pages to address 40 pages of arguments.

Now, if I can address the Township's [sic] main arguments regarding the phrasing of the initiatives. The main issue here is that they are not stating -- they may be stating -- providing definitions that are legally correct but they are doing so in an incredibly misleading fashion by selectively omitting necessary information.

No one is putting them under any obligation to describe these co-located marijuana business, but if they are in behooves them to describe them in a way that is not intentionally misleading. Not using a plural at least — at the very least mentioning that they would only be operating in a single location.

Similarly with the zoning they are selectively focusing on the fact of -- of how their local zoning ordinances work without providing anyone who reads the

ballot with a context. And, it's not enough to say that they can contact their township representative or something like that, it has be clear to an average voter what they are voting for and what they are voting against.

And, the language cannot be leading or prejudicial.

And, as a final matter, we are not seeking for the passage of our approved language, we are merely seeking the language that is not prejudicial on this ballot initiative.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

The Court having reviewed pleadings, hearing oral argument on defendants' -- plaintiff's ex parte motion for a writ of mandamus, emergency motion for declaratory judgment, and motion for TRO, the Court will cite that a writ of mandamus is properly granted when a plaintiff has a clear legal right to performance of a specific duty, defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, the act is ministerial, and no other adequate legal or equity remedy exists that might achieve the same result. MCL 168.646a(2) provides in relevant part that the ballot wording of the ballot question must be certified to the proper local or county clerk no later than 4:00 p.m. on the 12th Tuesday before the election.

Here the deadline was August 16th of 2022.

1	Plaintiff's complaint was not filed until August 18 of
2	2022, after the expiration of the deadline. Therefore,
3	plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought and the
4	Court is without authority to grant this writ of mandamus.
5	Plaintiff does not have a clear legal duty legal right
6	to the requested performance and defendant does not have a
7	clear legal duty to perform.
8	The Court is also going to find that the
9	language here is a discretionary function and therefore
10	not ministerial.
11	So, therefore, your motion is denied. Thank
12	you.
13	MR. GRANDSTAFF: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	MR. KUMMER: Thank you, Your Honor.
15	(At 10:33 a.m., proceeding concluded.)
16	* * * * *

STATE OF MICHIGAN)

COUNTY OF OAKLAND)ss.

I certify that this transcript is a true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability of the proceeding in this case before the Honorable YASMINE I. POLES, as recorded by the clerk.

Proceedings were recorded and provided to this transcriptionist by the Circuit Court and this certified reporter accepts no responsibility for any events that occurred during the above proceedings, for any inaudible and/or indiscernible responses by any person or party involved in the proceeding or for the content of the recording provided.

Dated: August 31, 2022

/s/ Kara L. Van Dam

Kara L. Van Dam, CER #7987